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Abstract: This paper explores Mao Zedong’s conceptualization of “national form” during the 1930s-
1940s as a reinvention of imagining China. Mao takes premodern and indigenous China as the Other in 
translating the theory of “class-nation” of the twentieth century international communist movement 
into a discursive practice for creating a new nation. Sinicization (中国化 ) or “making Chinese,” 
therefore, is not merely the representation of national language and culture of China, but the 
performative discourse that reinvents the “Chinese nation” via affective (aesthetic) politics. Such 
aesthetic, emotive, and affective “form” reconstructs time and space, and symbolically produces the 
subject of revolution. This reconstructed China thorough Mao’s “national form” is an integral part of 
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Reinventing China: Mao’s Ideas on National Reform 
 
As China has rapidly moved toward the world's center stage, ideas about the Chinese experience, 
Chinese path ("the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics" in Chinese official terms), Beijing 
Consensus, and ultimately the China Model, promoted largely by the Chinese state, have gained 
traction across the world. Chinese exceptionalism and singularity are presented as a corrective to 
Western dominance. Among academic discussions, Mao's theory and practice, known as "Chinese 
Marxism" or the “Sinicization of Marxism," has received new attention as an indigenous resource of 
Chinese exceptionalism. To criticize European and American centralism, Jameson advanced the theory 
of the "National Allegory" and the "Cultural Revolution" of the Third World. His theory has been 
applauded in China as an affirmation of the particularity of China, and, by the same token, a 
recognition of Maoism as a theory of anti-capitalist modernity. Moreover, under the critical rubrics of 
postcolonialism, Mao’s “national form” is touted as the epitome of Eastern countries obtaining their 
own subjectivities. Nevertheless, we should note the structural, historical and contextual differences 
between Jameson’s appropriation of Mao and Mao’s own theory and practice.  Liu Kang alerts us to the 
problems of this kind of "traveling theory" between so-called Jamesonism in China and Jameson's own 
Maoist imagination. Jameson’s selective misreading of Mao conceals serious flaws inherent in 
Jameson’s theory. Likewise, Chinese Jamesonism does the same damage (“The Destiny”). With regard 
to Mao and the China Question, a Chinese exceptionalism, wedded to Eurocentrism, may kill off 
possibilities to reimagine China theoretically. In addition, postcolonial theory, which is opposed to any 
kind of nationalism, may not help us rethink what East Asian nationalist movements can offer us 
(Ahmad 95). Therefore, questions such as “Can Maoist revolutionary legacy be understood as a vision 
of alternative modernity?” and “To what extent is Mao's Chinese Marxism exceptional within the 
historical context of international communism?” resurface in the latest debates. These questions call 
for a further historical and genealogical analysis of Mao's construction of China.  
While Mao conceived of his theoretical premises in his On Practice and On Contradiction in 1937, he 
broached the “national form” in 1938 from literary and aesthetic perspectives. Although “national 
form” as a crucial notion in Mao’s theory has received inadequate attention in the West, in China it has 
always been a major issue of debate. The idea of “national form” as pertains to premodern tradition, 
as a response to the Japanese invasion and the "new life movement" launched by the Chiang Kai-shek 
government, or as a rallying cry for autonomy from the Comintern led by Stalin, has increasingly 
come under fire. As Mao emphasized, only through the mediation of “national form” could Marxism 
materialize. The “national form” should be deemed as a certain form constituting an “imagined 
community” with its distinct subjectivity, time, and space. Moreover, only by this form can abstract 
Marxist theories be represented in history with its revolutionary agents and activities. However, it 
cannot be said these ideas are indigenous to Chinese tradition. Among various versions of cultural 
exceptionalism such as “Confucian China” and “poetic China,” Mao's “national form” is probably the 
least viable with regard to the Chinese indigenous tradition. Paradoxically, it is precisely this kind of 
unrealistic “national form” that served ultimately as a catalyst to Marxism’s realization in China, as the 
most important part of China's identity today. Mao's “national form” occurred in the complicated 
context of anti-colonialism, nationalism, and class struggle. It is not simply a nationalist movement, 
nor a socialist movement.  Moreover, it is not merely an integration of Marxist theory with a national 
tradition. It is a vastly complex discursive practice of discontinuity, rupture, limit, threshold, series, 
and transformation, as Foucault puts it (21). The discursive formations of “nation” and “class” in 
Chinese Revolution are equally significant intertextual events.                                                                              
 Marx criticizes nationalism as parochial (266) and Benedict Anderson believes that it is beyond 
Marxism (3). However, Marxism and nationalism are not so separate. Ernest Gellner interprets class 
revolution from the perspective of nationalism: “When a nation became a class, a visible and 
unequally distributed category in an otherwise mobile system, did it become politically conscious and 
activist. Only when a class happened to be (more or less) a ‘nation’ did it turn from being a class-in-
itself into a class-for-itself, or a nation-for-itself. Neither nations nor classes seem to be political 
catalysts: only nation-classes or class-nations are such” (121). 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the conceptions about nation-classes or class-nations 
enabled a theoretical understanding of the nationalist movement intertwined with the Marxist 
movement. Prasenjit Duara views class as a trope that constructs a particular and powerful 
representation of the nation. His view derives from his analysis of modern Chinese history. Duara 
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notes that early Chinese communists imagined the nation in terms of class. And he declares that 
during the course of modern Chinese history, the class has lost its ability in identity construction, and 
that class-based representations of the nation would hardly ever return (12-13). However, when 
Duara deconstructs linear and progressive history with the nation as the subject, he inevitably 
simplifies the narrative by conflating transformation, contention, and consolidations in the complex 
discursive formation of class and nation. While Marxism entered China and prompted the conception of 
“national form” in the context of Chinese nationalism, it resembles a Deleuzian rhizome, taken from a 
kind of root system found in nature that is non-linear, non-hierarchical, and decentralized. What has 
created a straight and clear linear historical illusion is the complex discursive formation (Foucault) on 
the class-nation.  
Since antiquity, the notion of China (or so-called Chineseness) has been constantly modified, 
transformed, and reinvented. With the colonial expansion to East Asia in the late nineteenth century, 
and under the influence of nationalism, China acquired the meaning of a modern nation. However, 
there was still no consensus on the specific meaning of China. The Republican Revolution (1911), 
which changed the slogan “Anti-Manchu Revolution” into "Five Ethnic Republics," did not bring the 
national crisis to an end. The anxiety about "what is China" reemerged in the 1930s. At the end of 
1936, in an impoverished, communist-occupied rural area of Northwestern China, Mao began to 
consider the issue of a cultural struggle during a respite in the military war. After a series of 
theoretical and cultural preparations, in 1938 he revised his speech to the high-ranking Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) cadres, “The Position of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War,” 
dictating that Chinese Marxism should be in a "Chinese style and Chinese taste” (中国作风和中国气派), 
“so that it has Chinese characteristics in every performance." Mao made it clear that his purpose was 
to “make Marxism Chinese,” or facilitate the "Sinicization of Marxism” (261). Mao’s canonic speech 
inaugurated the campaign of making Marxism Chinese, which ultimately catapulted the Chinese 
Marxism bearing his own name, that is, Mao Zedong Thought, to the ideological shrine of the CCP in 
1945. Nevertheless, what is truly at stake here is that neither the "Chinese style" nor "Chinese 
characteristics" were self-evident, even though they in Mao’s view serve as prerequisite for the 
making of Chinese Marxism. It is of critical significance and interest for us to interrogate the discursive 
formation of these concepts in China during the 1930s in order to understand the complex process of 
Sinicization of Marxism. 
Roughly at the same time in China under Chiang Kai-shek’s reign, there were two main 
formulations of China or Chineseness. One was “premodern China” against the modern West. The 
other was “cultural China,” highlighting the China/West dichotomy. In Wang Hui’s view, Mao rejected 
the view of the May Fourth intellectuals, who attempted to build a “China without Chineseness” by way 
of breaking down “Chineseness” under the rubrics of modernity/tradition, and consequently joining the 
western order of temporality. From the postcolonial China Studies point of view, the May Fourth 
“China without Chineseness” was little more than a replica of western colonialist discourse. By 
analyzing the translingual practice from Arthur Smith’s Chinese characters to Lu Xun’s novels, Lydia 
Liu presented that the missionaries' national nature theory was the main source of Lu Xun's idea on 
national character, and the western modernity discourse thus shaped the imagination of China ( 45-
76). In the 1930’s, Chinese left-wing critics also accused such views as attempts to culturally colonize 
China. However, such a view was actually short-lived (Ye). The China Question underwent drastic 
changes during WWI and WWII.  
Hobsbawm describes how the collapse of the great multinational empires of central and eastern 
Europe and the Russian revolution made it desirable for the Allies to play the Wilson card against the 
Bolshevik card (131). Under such circumstances, nationalism movements in the Third World were 
more complicated. The so-called nonresistant modernization was rare.  More instances of resistance 
occurred, either driven by nationalism, or under various guises and tortuous means.  Moreover, 
resistance was not merely waged by Marxist parties. In the 1930s, the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, 
or KMT) and many intellectuals also trumpeted national self-confidence and cultural nationalism. In 
1934, Chiang Kai-shek launched the “New Life Movement,” calling for "national rejuvenation" and 
incorporating Confucianism with the KMT party-state. Non-Marxist intellectuals (who were in the 
mainstream during the KMT reign) also favored “national rejuvenation” and advocated a nationalist 
notion of “Chinese characteristics,” believing China can “stand side by side with other countries in the 
cultural arena” (Wang X.). It should be noted that the CCP, at that time, while promoting “national 
form,” assaulted this kind of KMT “Chinese exceptionalism” as being “variants of colonialist discourse,” 
which was opposed to modern internationalism.    
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Mao did not advocate synchronicity between the East and the West. He leveled criticism at both the 
East and the West from the perspective of disempowered poor nations in the colonial context. In Mao’s 
judgment, “Capitalism is doomed. Only when the people of the world form a united front with the 
oppressed nations can there be a way out” (“On New” 167). Mao called for resistance of the poor, 
oppressed nations against imperialism. He no longer saw China under the rubrics of the East/West, 
China/West dichotomies. Rather, he viewed Chinese revolution as an integral part of the worldwide 
revolution and resistance. Under such rubrics, “China” and “the world” belonged to each other and 
Eurocentrism could be transcended by the New China as the center of the New World.  China was 
conceived of as neither a “local” within the West-dominated world, nor an Orient parallel to Occident, 
a China alongside the West. Instead, Mao wanted to create a new center that transcended the 
colonialism embedded in “premodern China” as well as “cultural China” discourses, which, as Mao 
assailed bluntly, were nothing more than “colonial China.” Yoshimi Takeuchi, renowned Japanese 
scholar of modern Chinese culture, showed a keen interest in Mao’s formulations, seeing Mao’s 
“nation,” by way of resistance, as promising a subjectivity renouncing colonialist constraint, hence 
avoiding Japanese-style replication of western models or westernization (147-51). 
Mao refused to follow the so-called Europeanization as intellectuals in the May Fourth  Movement 
did.  Meanwhile, he did not replicate the Soviet Russia mode. Though his idea about the “national 
form” closely related to Stalin’s views of the nation and nationality, differences between them about 
what a nation is or how to solve national problems are far greater than similarities. Stalin considered 
nationalism as a bourgeois ideology. He contended that the marginalized bourgeoisie of the oppressed 
nations would naturally rise up, but their nationalist movement would suppress the workers’ 
liberalization movements. The bourgeoisie in those countries would frame the "national problems" as 
of common interest to both the proletariat and the bourgeois, but this was brusquely dismissed by 
Stalin as deceptive propaganda, for he believed that it would relinquish class interests of the 
proletariat and intellectually enslave workers (Marxism 20). Theoretically, Stalin rejected “national 
spirits” in his attack against nationalism, and insisted on natural attributes of the nation: “A nation is a 
historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, 
territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (11). 
Stalin’s definition of the nation is anti-culturalist. Roland Boer states that Stalin may have sought 
to challenge the culturist definitions and their amorphous term of “national culture.” Stalin attacked 
national spirits because he believed cultural-national autonomy could not materialize in backward 
nations, which confined their people to backwardness with their traditions and customs.  Therefore, it 
was only by drawing backward nations into the orbit of advanced culture that the national problems 
could be solved. Stalin’s principal objective was to unite the multiethnic groups in the Soviet Union 
under the Soviet Communist Party. He wanted to “eliminate by all means the national and ethnic 
barriers standing among the proletariats” (“Social” 10). 
Stalin’s view greatly affected communist movements in small and poor nations. Ironically, when 
Stalin attempted to upgrade backward nations with socialism, socialists in these backward nations 
hoped their nationalist goals would be supported by the socialist movement. Qu Qiubai, one of the 
early leaders of the CCP, listened to Stalin's report on "national issues" at the 10th Congress of the 
Soviet Communist Party in Moscow, 1921. Qu had a strong interest in Soviet Russia's goal of 
"assisting the small and poor nations to skip capitalism and reach communism” (190) and considered 
it to be a way to solve the "Chinese problem" and to achieve national rejuvenation. By advocating the 
"popularization" of literary forms and literary language, Qu tried to launch a grassroots cultural 
movement of poor nations to surpass Western civilization. He was concerned with the question of the 
"proletarian leadership in the cultural movement" and devoted himself to promoting the "cultural 
revolution" after he was ousted from the CCP’s leadership as a result of the catastrophic defeat of the 
Chinese communist revolution in 1928.  
Among those attending the fourth Comintern Conference in Moscow were Qu Qiubai, the CCP’s 
young leader, and Antonio Gramsci, the aspiring leader of the Italian Communist Party. Both shared a 
remarkably similar view of revolution starting from the cultural terrain, despite the lack of any 
evidence for their possible meetings in Moscow, let alone exchanges of views. Facing the national 
crisis in Italy, which was in some measures akin to that of China, Gramsci discovered the idea of 
hegemony as a possible solution to the national problems. Moreover, Gramsci seriously explored the 
national question in the communist movement. He did not agree with Stalin’s view of the nation. He 
considered it meaningless to simply blame nationalism, and did not think geographical boundaries 
mattered much. Gramsci's nation is closer to the nation-state in the political and cultural sense. He 
emphasized that “The state must contain ethical and cultural significance” (526). He criticized the 
Risorgimento in the late nineteenth century as a passive revolution, because it ignored the peasant 
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question in the South. “Only laborers and their intellectuals can dialectically continue the Italian 
tradition," Gramsci insisted. To mobilize the peasants, Gramsci highlighted the role "form" would play 
in the formation of the collective will: “Such a procedure stimulates the artistic imagination of those 
who have to be convinced, and gives political passions a more concrete form” (316). The purpose of 
this “form” is political. The formalized imagination, or fantasy, which Gramsci refers to as a creation of 
a concrete phantasm, acts on a dispersed and shattered people to arouse an organized collective will. 
This “form” is not to determine what the “national” is, on the basis of the existing national life or 
national tradition, but to conjure up, as it were, a "fantasy" with the "collective will of the 
organization.” Of course, Gramsci, imprisoned by Mussolini till his death, had no way to live up to his 
ideals. 
Although Mao was under the influence of Stalin when he considered the national question, his view 
of “national form” was closer to that of Qu and Gramsci than to Stalin. In other words, Qu’s ideas had 
had a much stronger and more direct impact on Mao. Qu was thinking deeply about cultural revolution 
in Jiangxi’s CCP-controlled rural area after being purged from the CCP’s central leadership, while at 
roughly the same time, Mao was also ousted by the Soviet-designated new CCP leadership in Jiangxi 
and had quite a bit of time to think and write. It is highly likely Qu and Mao had extensive exchanges 
of ideas then, though the actual Qu-Mao contacts have not been extensively investigated. Mao also 
talked about "popularization" and offered a new understanding of this conception. He described 
“popularization” as a process in which writers and artists’ thoughts and feelings should be integrated 
with those of the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers (“Talks” 115). Mao attached great 
importance to the issue of language. In his opinion, language meant a kind of (aesthetic) taste or 
style related to "thoughts and feelings.” 
  Liu Kang uses "aesthetic ideology" to decode Mao's “national form” in his pathbreaking study 
that includes a rigorous exploration of the Qu-Mao lineage. Liu argues that the “national form” of the 
so-called "Chinese style" has become the essence or content of the Sinicization of Marxism and 
denotes a question of ideological representation and emotional (aesthetic) issues. And as such, the 
issue of “national form” and the "Sinicization of Marxism" should be interrogated in terms of 
emotional, affective, and aesthetic dimensions of political practice. It must be emphasized that the 
“national form” as "emotional mobilization" cannot be regarded as just something to adapt to or 
express the emotions of people at the bottom.  The internal resource of “national form” is not just an 
emotional representation, rather, it is an emotional re-creation or reinvention.                                                                                       
When talking about how “national form” makes Chinese Marxism an emotional (aesthetic) issue, 
Liu contends that national form as mediation has a twofold objective: it is Mao’s resolution of the 
transformation or concretization of Marxism; and it represents Chinese Marxism in both a discursive 
and political sense. It is constative and performative, simultaneously making statements and 
constituting practices of a specific kind. The second objective is especially complex. It dictates that 
national form must represent itself as a concrete resolution, or vice versa, that the representation of a 
resolution constitutes the resolution itself. Alternatively stated, the resolution of the Sinicization of 
Marxism lies in the representation of Marxism through a national form. Hence, a national form 
“becomes the very substance or content of the Sinicization of Marxism” (“Knowledge”). 
When discussing the subjectivity of "women," Judith Butler draws on Foucault's view of how 
discourse of judicial power creates a reproducible subject. She also quotes Austin in order to analyze 
the performative function of woman in shaping gender (Butler 4). The form producing a nation’s 
subjectivity should also be understood in a performative way. Sinicization is not a representation of 
national life, language and characteristics, but an aesthetic (emotional) construction appealing to body 
politics and reinvention of national performative discourse.  In the process of discursive practice, 
Sinicization of Marxism is not to break the national barriers, but to transform it from foreign and 
abstract language into vernacular language of the populace, i.e. peasantry, by giving it a "national 
form" with specific affect, and thereby creating a "reality" that can be reproduced. 
The concept of the “national form” does not emphasize indigenous continuity. When initially 
promoted by Mao, the so-called “Chinese characteristics” had an ambiguous meaning, a phrase full of 
contradictions regarding national tradition. The “national form” had little to do with the 文、诗、词、赋 
(Wen, Shi, Ci, and Fu Chinese literary forms) recorded in Chinese canons. In addition, the selection of 
Chinese characteristics was determined through repeated deliberation and selection by administrative 
orders. Some of the Yan’an cohort of “cultural workers,” such as Xiang Linbing, Chen Boda, Ai Siqi, 
and Xiao San, believed that “folk forms” such as folk tales, local ditties, librettos, drum songs, and 
Lian Hua Lao (popular songs sung to the accompaniment of castanets), should be fully used (Xu, 7-11 
21-27 193-96). Opponents retorted that the old folk forms contain slavish remnants that cannot be 
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eliminated through the implantation of new content. Moreover, it is questionable whether the folk form 
could be equated with the “national form” (Wang S. 615-16). 
As a non-CCP, maverick Marxist literary theorist outside the Yan’an area, Hu Feng viewed the issue 
differently. He believed that although the "folk forms" manifested some aspects of national life, they 
were overall imbued with the ideology of the dominant feudalist ruling class. Therefore, to harbor 
illusions towards the folk forms was theoretically blind, neglecting the feudalist structural 
determinants underlying these forms for the sake of some emotional appeal  (“On National” 253-54). 
Instead, Hu Feng advocated transforming “folk forms” with the class consciousness and subjectivity of 
the progressive intellectuals (Suzuki). Hu's idea coincides with Lukacs' emphasis on "class 
consciousness.” However, Mao did not agree with this prudent attitude of overcoming "form" through 
subjectivity. Mao emphasized the power of literature and art, which he believed would "wake up the 
people, inspire them, promote them to unite and fight" (“Talks” 128). He underscored the voluntarism 
embedded in literature and arts: "If there is no such literature and art, then this task cannot be 
completed, nor can it  be completed effectively and quickly" (128). For Mao, the importance of the 
“national form” is not about whether it reflects a national character. Rather, it is a performative 
discourse that has the function of "arousing" and "inspiring" the populace. Mao neither defined the 
nation by regional or national cultural tradition, nor, as Hu Feng did, differentiated class and nation. 
What Mao tried to establish was a concept of “the greatest majority of the Chinese people” as the 
foundation of the nation. This concept in fact came close to the Gramscian idea of the popular-
national. “National form,” in a nutshell, is a popular movement of the total aggregate of the "the 
people" rather than that which was purely defined by class. 
“Folk forms,” on the other hand, seemed quite appealing in grassroots mobilizations. Although Mao 
did not clearly point to “folk form” when he first proposed “national form,” he soon began to attach 
importance to it. He was not concerned about the extent to which “folk forms” was part of the national 
tradition, or whether there was an ideological conflict between “folk forms” and Marxism. He instead 
focused on how “folk forms” would bring together and create a “People’s China” that was not only 
different from the West, but also different from the Soviet bloc. Therefore, we should not regard “folk 
forms” as merely literary and art styles, and treat all “folk forms” as “national forms.” Rather, “folk 
forms” should be understood as a political movement in the people’s name, a performative and 
constitutive act. Only in the symbolic, aesthetic, and affective sense, the conglomeration of "ninety 
per cent of the people," namely the peasantry, could “folk forms” become the “national form.” 
In Mao’s vocabulary, “folk” refers to a special distinction. To transcend the West/East dichotomy 
brought about by industrialization, Mao had a strong interest in the inland areas of China that were 
not affected by industrialization. He Guimei mentions that the primary areas for the practice of the 
“national form” were in Northwest, North, Southwest, and Central China, less exposed to colonial and 
semi-colonial incursions of the Western powers from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth 
century. He Guimei therefore distinguishes between inland and coastal areas as a rubric of the CCP’s 
modernization project. Moreover, in addition to the coastal/inland, there was also an urban/rural 
divide. With his critique of "colonial China," Mao was wary of how Chinese culture might be affected by 
colonialism. For him, China's “national form” mainly referred to the folk cultural forms of the rural 
hinterland. When Zhou Yang, the CCP’s propaganda chief in Yan’an, referred to "folk forms" as "old 
forms" and referred to "rural areas" as "old China," Mao rebuked him outright. Mao insisted that "the 
so-called democracy in China is basically the peasant rebellion."  Therefore, he said, " At present, New 
China is essentially left in rural areas" (“To Zhou” 259-60). Mao in effect reversed the urban "new 
China" and rural "old China" distinction, taking the rural area as the center of the "new China," calling 
the rural China “our China.”    
  Viewing Mao’s urban/rural reversal from outside Yan’an, Hu Feng once again expressed his 
concern about the “national form” moving closer to "peasant culture" and his worries about the revival 
of populism (“On National” 262). However, Hu ‘s understanding of the “national form” was rather 
rigid, though righteous on its own terms, in that his position was to steadfastly uphold the 
enlightenment legacy of the May Fourth Movement. In the end, with little understanding of Mao’s 
politics of peasant rebellion, Hu was incapable of fully grasping Mao 's true intent of advocating the 
rural folk forms. Mao's interests in the "peasants’ tastes" was premised on their pure anti-colonial 
resistance. His purpose in the "emotional mobilization" was to rally the peasants around an abstract 
national subjectivity, rather than helping them achieve their individual interests and demands. Mao’s 
strategy of appropriating rural “folk form” into his “national form” was aimed at uniting the peasants, 
who had little if any “class consciousness” on their own, to accomplish the political task of fighting 
against “the colonial China,” that is, urban, coastal, industrializing areas. In short, the peasants were 
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to become a force that was “represented,” rather than a force representing itself, under Mao’s 
revolutionary scheme.  
In the Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx talked about the relationship of the French peasantry and the 
monarchy: “They (peasants) cannot represent themselves; they must be represented. Their 
representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an 
unlimited governmental power that protects them against the other classes and sends them rain and 
sunshine from above” (187-88). The master and authority who “sends them rain and sunshine from 
above” is as much a political figure as a symbiotic figure of trope, in terms of its affective, ideological, 
and, indeed, aesthetic efficacy. In this respect, Marx’s political/semiotic analysis of the French 
“master” and “authority” makes perfect sense in understanding Mao’s scheme of “national form.”  
Moreover, Mao's tactic of mobilizing the peasants was similar to Gramsci’s idea of hegemony, which 
postulates that a modern Machiavellian “Prince,” namely the Italian Communist Party, would be able 
to rally a “popular-national” front amidst the Italian subalterns, or peasants and other underdogs, 
toward the goal of revolutionary insurgency. The Althusser-Machiavelli-Gramsci-Mao lineage is 
interrogated by Yan Fang at some length in this special issue.  
Mao, likewise, devised the national form, which would metaphorically and symbolically give 
meaning to peasants and represent them at the same time. Moreover, the peasants in the rural-based 
New China were not simply represented. They were to be reproduced and reinvented as a new class 
with a collective will under the CCP’s leadership (or Gramscian hegemony). It is the emotionally 
mobilized and reproduced “new peasantry” and the “new countryside,” which was imagined, and 
symbolically produced by the folk forms, that constitute the “People’s China.” In the context of 
creating a historical will, the “folk forms” is the spatialization of historical time in a Bakhtinian sense. 
When discussing Goethe’s novels, Bakhtin offers the conception of “a creative humanization of this 
locality,” which transforms a portion of terrestrial space into a place of historical life for people, into a 
corner of the historical world (34). The folk form transforms the specific place into a humanized 
locality, i.e., a part of historical life. Space and history are integrated into an indivisible whole, and 
create a new reality.   
As Liu Kang puts it, “For Mao this is precisely a question of language, an aesthetic as well as 
ideological issue of form—transformation and re-formation of a universal, albeit foreign, language into 
an indigenous and national one” (“Chinese Exceptionalism”). Perhaps this is what Chinese Marxism or 
Sinicization of Marxism is about: it transforms Marxism into a "National Movement" and reinvents 
national tradition for itself. In short, it reproduces time, space and subject. Mao's “national form” is 
isolated from both the Westernized China imagined by intellectuals in the New Culture Movement and 
the imagination of the continuous cultural China of the 1930s. At the same time, it rejects Soviet 
Russia's assumption that China would become a locality for the regional practice of the socialist 
movement. 
Meanwhile, the China in Mao’s mind should not be construed as the particularity that challenges 
totality in an Althusserian sense.  Mao stressed that "the special and the general are inseparable from 
each other, and that division is divorced from the objective truth" (" Dialectical” 270). A China, 
exploited, yet not fully conquered by imperialism-colonialism, or a semi-colonial and semi-feudalist 
China, could instead become the site of strongest resistance to and transcendence over colonialism. 
Therefore, Mao took China's problem as the world's problem, and the solution of China's problem is 
not a regional and singular event, but one with universal value. Mao prophesied that "the free and 
liberated new China must appear in East Asia and become a very important part of the bright world in 
the future. Such a China will benefit not only 450 million Chinese, but also all humankind”  ("On 
New”167). Hence to regard China’s modernity as exceptional erases its underlying universalist 
impulse.  
In his rebuttal of Pollock’s view of Japanese modernity, Naoki Sakai contends that exceptionality is 
not the Other, or divorced from universality, but an integral part of universality. Exceptionality is the 
realization of universality (157). Chinese exceptionalism pits "China" against "the world" (the West) 
under the dichotomous rubrics of exceptionality/universality, and consequently restricts the richness 
and divergence of the theory that “China” may develop. Liu Kang also suggests that Chinese 
exceptionalism conjures up an imaginary condition of existence in which China is parallel to the world, 
and is at the same time separate from the world in terms of its origin and history. It imagines itself as 
a lofty tree standing alone and above the world of trees. After all, it is nothing more than an 
embodiment of “modern metaphysics,” or a deterministic, teleological, and dichotomous mode of 
thinking that has shaped much of modernity’s conceptual framework (Liu, “China”). Moreover, Chinese 
exceptionalism ignores and suppresses the real Otherness within and without, turning a blind eye to 
the symbiotic, paradoxical, and complicated condition of existence. 
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In conclusion, the China reinvented by Mao's “national form” is not simply a product or concoction 
of Marxism and Chinese nationalism. It redefines nationalism under the circumstances of global 
capitalism. It reinvents both a new class of Chinese peasants and a space of rural-based New China, 
under the banner of Marxism. It is a performative discourse of affective and aesthetic politics with an 
enduring impact, reverberating in populist-nationalist sentiments that seem to prevail in China today.  
However, this Chinese national form is not an indigenous discourse stemming from China’s tradition. 
Quite on the contrary, it showcases the inseparability and integration of China in the world, or as Liu 
Kang puts it, China of the world (China being an integral part of the world), instead of China and the 
world (China and the world being separate, parallel entities). The complex and labyrinthian 
entanglement of China in the world can be better understood, as Liu suggests, as a Deleuzian 
rhizome, decentralized with multiple dimensions, capable of qualitative variation and irreducible to any 
dualisms or structural oppositions. The conception of "China of the world" helps to “dismantle the 
totalizing myth by recuperating it as a diverse body of paradoxical and heterogeneous experience and 
conditions of possibility” (Liu, Aesthetics 7). 
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